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Abstract. In this article I paint a concise portrait of world economic and population 
history. Key factors include the world population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 
role of technology in relation to the environmental impact of economic activity is 
represented by an Environmental Efficiency Factor (EEF). It is asserted that any modern 
political theory aspiring to comprehensiveness should deal with four subject matters: The 
legitimate level of human interference with the rest of nature; the level of the human 
population; the nature and extent of the economy and technology. Past GDP growth rates 
combined with UN population projections result in a number of scenarios of future real 
GDP to the year 2300. In the course of inquiry, three measures of all time economic 
activity are introduced: All time world GDP per capita, accumulated world GDP and the 
annual growth rate of accumulated world GDP. In conclusion, I describe under what 
circumstances it is conceivable that the growth economy can persist for at least 300 more 
years. Directions of inquiry are offered to three groups: Those who want to maintain the 
growth economy for as long as possible; those who want world population to stay, in the 
long run, at a level comparable to that of today; and those who want to minimize 
environmental pressure. 
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1. Introduction 
 
If we put the causes of the ecological crisis on a formula, the outcome would 
probably be something in the line of this: 
 
Environmental pressure = (World population) * (Consumption/person) * x 
 
where ‘x’ represents our consumption’s degree of environmental impact. Now, 
suppose that we can replace ‘(Consumption/person)’ with Gross Domestic Product 
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(GDP)1 per capita, and reshape ‘x’ as an Environmental Efficiency Factor (EEF). 
The equation would then appear like this: 
 
Environmental pressure = (World population) * (GDP per capita) * EEF2 
 
During the last century, population increased by a factor of four, and GDP per 
capita at least by a factor of five (cf. Tables 1 and 2). World GDP, in result, 
increased by a factor of at least twenty. Clearly, any descriptive explanation of the 
rise of the ecological crisis has to take these material facts into account. But what 
are the long-term prospects of the growth economy? If you ask a contemporary 
economist, chances are (s)he will maintain that the scope of  any reliable economic 
prediction must be limited to the very near future. As any observant reader of 
economic news will know, the level of economic growth is at times hard to predict 
even a year in advance. And still, your question wouldn’t be quite as silly as it 
might sound. After all, how can we possibly deal with the so-called environmental 
problems, if we know nothing at all about the future state of the economy? 
Decades after the advent of a vocabulary of environmental problems, it is 
evident that the effect of environmentally friendly advances in technology and 
lifestyle are in many fields eaten up by growth in the volume of the economy. 
Moreover, particular problems are often solved through means by which new, 
often unanticipated kinds of problems arise. There is no such thing as a problem-
free technology. Since 1973, the size of the world economy has more than doubled 
(cf. Table 3). For how long can we expect improvements in terms of what I call 
the Environmental Efficiency Factor to go on? 
What most economists tend to neglect is that the growth economy, considered 
as a historical phenomenon, has a beginning, and, in the time scale of civilizations, 
is likely one day to come to an end. While eternal growth might in theory be a 
defendable position, it definitely calls for articulated justification. All too often it 
is simply taken for granted that our economic system is representative of a future 
without end. 
If  there is one assertion mainstream economists seem to find particularly 
ridiculous, it is this: That growth is no longer an option. And indeed, it would be 
ridiculous to make such an assertion (for one example, see Goldsmith 2001). In 
general, assertions of this kind seem to originate from two environmentalist 
fallacies. First, the mistaken view that we are running out of resources. In 
economic terms, however, what can be used as a resource is not given a priori, 
rather, it’s a matter of technology. In economic history, there is a clear tendency 
that more and more ‘parts’ of the natural environment are made use of and thus 
transformed into resources. Second, the mistaken view that environmental 
                                                     
1
  Gross Domestic Product is a standard measure of all the economic activity that takes place within 
a country during a year. Estimates of GDP are normally presented in nominal figures, calculated 
at current prices and exchange rates. In this article GDP is to be understood as real GDP, which 
is calculated at fixed prices. This enables us to use GDP as a tool in historical comparisons. 
2
  If we rearrange this equation, we see that the Environmental Efficiency Factor is defined as  
EEF = (Environmental pressure)/(world GDP). 
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problems will somehow make further growth too costly. There is not much solid 
evidence supporting this view. Sure, environmental costs change price formation, 
thus redirecting investments. But the more fundamental economic mechanisms, 
such as the drive for growth in the economy, are generally left intact. There are no 
signs that the era of the growth economy is about to end anytime soon. The end of 
the growth economy is not a matter of faith. It is a matter of choice. Accordingly, 
unless our worldviews and values change profoundly, the depletion of the natural 
environment is likely to deepen and broaden in scope for a long time still. 
 
 
2. Matters of scale 
 
There are at least four subject matters that any political theory aspiring to 
comprehensiveness should deal with, all of which are encompassed in the afore-
mentioned equation: 
–  the legitimate level of human interference with the rest of nature 
–  the level of the human population 
–  the nature and extent of the economy3 
–  technology 
These are all matters of scale. The significance of scale should be obvious. 
What is perfectly legitimate behavior at a certain population level can have 
disastrous consequences when carried out by ten or a hundred times as many. In 
general, the ecological impact of a particular pattern of behavior lies just as much 
in the scale of actions as in the type of behavior itself. 
As initially stated by Arne Næss (1989:105–106) more than 30 years ago, it 
remains the case that “among activists within the ecological movement, people 
have been so fed up with unecological policies that the term ‘economics’ itself has 
become a kind of nasty word” – “nothing can be expected, think activists, from a 
study of economics – the economists are to be fought”. As Næss notes, it “is 
highly destructive to the deep ecology movement that supporters are silenced 
because they cannot stand up in public discussions with people who are well 
acquainted with economics.”4 As I attempt to demonstrate in this article, it makes 
good sense to talk about long-term scenarios in statistical terms. 
                                                     
3
  Basic issues of importance to the ecological crisis include traditionally anthropocentric notions 
such as property and territory. Cf. Tønnessen 2003:296. 
4
  Deep ecology, as advocated by Arne Næss, can be summarized by means of the deep ecology 
platform. Cf. Tønnessen 2003, which is mainly a Uexküllian interpretation of the deep ecology 
platform – the term ‘Uexküllian’ here referring to the Umwelt theory and theory of meaning of 
the Estonian-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944). One of the versions of the 
platform appears in Næss 1993:197. As for matters of population and economy, the deep ecology 
platform states that “[t]he flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller human population”; 
that basic economic, technological, and ideological structures must be changed, and that the 
“resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present”. “The ideological change”, 
according to Næss, “will be mainly that of appreciating life quality rather than adhering to an 
increasingly higher standard of living”. 
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I will start by giving a brief account of the demographic and economic world 
history. While there can be no accurate prognosis of future GDP in the long term, 
past GDP growth rates, combined with UN population projections, result in a 
number of scenarios of future world real GDP to the year of 2300. These will 
further be made use of in an investigation into application of the Environmental 
Efficiency Factor, which should be suitable to shed light on different attitudes to 
technology. In the course of my research, I will present three measures of all time 
economic activity. 
 
 
3. Population 
 
The following population estimates and projections are taken from Kremer 
(1993) and the United Nations (World Population to 2300) respectively5. 
 
 
Table 1. World population 1 mill. B.C. – 2300,  
Million 
 
  Projections 
Year Population Low Medium High 
–1 000 000 0.125    
–300 000 1    
–10 000 4    
–1000 50    
1 170    
1000 265    
1500 425    
1750 720    
1900 1 625    
1950 2 516    
2000 6 100    
2100  5 500 9 100 14 000 
2200  3 200 8 500 21 200 
2300  2 300 9 000 36 400 
 
 
After a long period of population growth at a rate previously unheard of, UN 
most probably expects the world population to stabilize at about 9 billion around the 
year 2070. Whereas the world population did not even double between year 1 and 
year 1000, in the last millennium it increased by a factor of 23. The UN expects the 
world population in 300 years to be somewhere in the range of 2.3 to 36.4 billion. It 
is worth noting that the only thing that distinguishes the high projection from the 
medium is an extra 0.2 children per woman. Similarly, in 300 years time 0.2 
children less per woman results in a population not of 9 billion, but of 2.3 billion. 
                                                     
5
  Up until 1950 Kremer asserts that the rate of growth of human populations was roughly 
proportional to their total level. 1 mill. B.C. – 1950: Kremer; 2000–2300: UN. 
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Observations: 
1. Population growth is likely to be far slower in the 21st century than in the 
20th. 
2. What lifestyles and policies we carry out today and during the next few 
decades are crucial in determining the state of the population in 100 or 300 years. 
3. From the viewpoint of the present, it seems achievable to enter a period of 
conscious decrease in world population at some point during the last half of this 
century. 
 
 
4. It’s the economy, stupid 
 
In 1998 J. Bradford DeLong, a Berkeley economist and former Clinton 
administration advisor, wrote a draft paper entitled “Estimating World GDP, One 
Million B.C. – Present” (Bradford DeLong 1998). Primary economic data is drawn 
from Monitoring the World Economy, l820–l992, a publication by OECD 
economist Angus Maddison (1995), now an emeritus professor at the University of 
Groningen. DeLong’s basic assumption is that the correlation between the level of 
wealth and population growth found in Maddison’s material is no coincidence. In 
other words, he assumes that the rate of population growth in pre-modern history 
can be interpreted as a sign of a corresponding growth rate concerning wealth. 
DeLong takes his population estimates from the abovementioned Kremer. One 
adjustment is made, however. Referring to William Nordhaus (1997), DeLong 
states that Maddison in his approach does not take account of the additional value 
of new goods introduced during the last two centuries. This theoretical disparity 
has the consequence that while Maddison states that modern wealth in the poorest 
countries is comparable to that of the first centuries A.D., DeLong claims that their 
level of wealth is clearly above the subsistence level of earlier human societies. 
His preferred estimates, as a result, are significantly lower than ‘Maddisonesque’ 
estimates, which he also calculates (here referred to as ‘Ex-Nordhaus’). 
 
 
Table 2. Annual world real GDP per capita 1 mill. B.C. – 2000,  
1990 USD 
 
Year Ex-Nordhaus DeLong 
–1 000 000 340 92 
–10 000 344 93 
–800 530 143 
1 404 109 
350 350 94 
1000 494 133 
1500 512 138 
1800 722 195 
1900 1 263 679 
1950 2 138 1 622 
2000 6 103 6 539 
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Observations: 
1. Prior to the last 500 years or so, human wealth was fairly stable at a rather 
low level. 
2. By 1800, quite a few countries had reached a level of wealth never before 
experienced in the history of mankind. 
3. Most of economic growth to date (considered as a rise in the level of wealth) 
has taken place during the 20th century. 
The data in Tables 3 and 4 are taken from two more recent works by Angus 
Maddison (2000 and 2003). 
 
 
Table 3. Annual world real GDP 1500–2000,  
Billion (million millions) 1990 USD 
 
Year GDP Index  
(1500 = 1) 
1500 0.24 1 
1820 0.69 3 
1870 1.12 5 
1913 2.74 11 
1950 5.37 22 
1973 16.05 67 
2000 36.50 152 
 
 
Observations: 
1. The size of the present global economy is at least 150 times that of the global 
economy in year 15006. 
2. The growth of the last half millennium can be attributed to two factors: 
Population growth and growth in GDP per capita, both of which have contributed 
significantly to overall growth7. 
 
 
Table 4. Annual world real GDP per capita growth rate 1500–2000,  
1990 USD 
 
Period Growth rate, % Name of period 
1500–1820 0.05  Proto-capitalist 
1820–1870 0.56  
1870–1913 1.30  
1913–1950 0.90  
1950–1973 2.88  
1973–2000 1.44  
Capitalist 
                                                     
6
  Note that DeLong’s assumptions would result in an even more significant increase, roughly by a 
factor of four. 
7
  In Maddison´s account these factors are of more or less equal significance; in DeLong’s account 
GDP per capita is the most significant. 
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Observations: 
1. The global level of wealth did not start to grow steadily until around 1820. 
2. Since then, growth rates have varied in cycles of half a century or less. 
 
 
 
5. Measures of all time economic activity 
 
In the preceding section I referred to a few basic facts about the development of 
the world economy to date. However, a more careful reading is in place. First, let 
us calculate all time world GDP per capita. In other words: What is the average 
level of wealth for all the 70 billion people or so that have ever lived? Calculations 
in Tables 5 and 6 are based on DeLong’s “Estimating World GDP” and Maddison 
1998 (prognosis 1995–2015). 
 
 
Table 5. All time world real GDP per capita 1 mill. B.C. – 2015,  
1990 USD 
 
Year Ex-Nordhaus DeLong 
–1 000 000 341   92 
–10 000 342   92 
–800 351   95 
1 362   97 
350 362   98 
1000 369   99 
1500 377 101 
1800 401 108 
1900 436 126 
1950 505 181 
1995 832 510 
2015 1 151   876 
 
 
Observations: 
1. Unlike the annual level of wealth, which has sometimes been increasing and 
sometimes been in decline, the all time level of wealth has probably been 
continuously growing for three millennia, although at first very slowly. 
2. By some point during the last half of the 20th century the all time level of 
wealth had doubled compared to the starting point. 
Next, let us consider accumulated world GDP. This is a measure of all 
economic activity that has ever taken place. 
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Table 6. Accumulated world real GDP 1 mill. B.C. – 2015, 
Billion (million millions) 1990 USD 
 
Year Ex-Nordhaus Percentage 
of 2005-value DeLong 
Percentage 
of 2005-value 
–300 000 84     4  23 2    
–10 000 275   14  74 5    
1 364   18  98 7    
1000 446   22  120 9    
1500 521   26  140 10    
1900 733   37  212 15    
2005 2 008 100  1 391 100    
2015 2 509 125  1 910 137    
 
 
Observations: 
1. By the year 1500, the economy of the era of hunting and gathering still 
accounted for at least half of the economic activity that had ever taken place. 
2. As of today, most of the economic activity that has ever taken place has 
taken place within the last century. 
Finally, the annual growth rate of accumulated world GDP (based on 
DeLong’s paper). In other words, an answer to the intriguing question: How much 
does one year of activity in the world economy amount to, in terms of all time 
economic activity? 
 
 
Table 7. Annual growth rate of accumulated world real GDP, 
10 000 B.C. – 1995 
 
Year Ex-Nordhaus, % DeLong, % 
–10 000 0.0006  0.0006  
1 0.02  0.02  
1000 0.03  0.03  
1500 0.05  0.05  
1900 0.4  0.7  
1950 0.7  1.6  
1975 1.6  3.0  
1995 2.1  3.5  
 
 
Observations: 
1. The all time economic activities of humankind have grown progressively 
faster ever since the agricultural revolution. 
2. Ever since some point during the 20th century, one year of economic activity 
has surpassed 1 % of all the economic activities that have (to that date) ever taken 
place. 
3. Due to the (relative) stabilization of the world population, this particular 
growth rate can probably be expected to reach a peak at some point during the 21st 
century. 
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6. Future scenarios 
 
Now that we have studied the past and present world economy in some detail, 
it’s time to return to matters of the future. First, let us assume that either the 
highest or the lowest growth rate from 1820 onwards (referred to in Table 4) 
materializes once again, or the average growth rate 1820–2000. If the future world 
economy develops somewhat in line with what it has done in the last two centuries 
or so, then how wealthy will an average human being be in 100, 200 or 300 years 
time? Tables 8 and 9 build on Maddison 2000 and 20038. 
 
 
Table 8. Annual world real GDP per capita 2000–2300, 
1990 USD. Scenarios 
 
 Growth rate 
Scenarios 2000–2300 Low Medium High 
Model period 1820–1870 1820–2000 1950–1973 
Annual growth rate 0.56 % 1.23 % 2.88 % 
GDP per capita 2100 10 509 20 415 102 829 
GDP per capita 2200 18 368 69 321 1 758 774 
GDP per capita 2300 32 107 235 391 30 081 927 
Index 2300 (2000 = 1) 5 39 5 004 
 
 
Observations: 
1. Given the lowest growth rate, the average human will reach a level of wealth 
comparable to that of USA today in 300 years. 
2. Given the medium growth rate, the average human will reach a level of 
wealth comparable to that of Europe today in 100 years, and a level never before 
experienced in 200 to 300 years time. 
3. Given the highest growth rate, the average human will reach a level of 
wealth never before experienced in 100 years, after which an era of true science 
fiction will be entered. 
Second, assume that one of the three UN population projections referred to in 
Table 1 will actually resemble the future population development. Combined with 
the aforementioned estimates of future GDP per capita, these projections result in 
the following scenarios of future world GDP: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8
  Note again that DeLong’s assumptions would result in even higher growth estimates. 
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Table 9. Annual world real GDP 2000–2300, 
Billion (million millions) 1990 USD. Scenarios 
 
  Population 
Year Growth rate Low Medium High 
Low 58 96 147 
Medium 112 186 286 2100 
High 566 936 1 440 
Low 59 156 389 
Medium 222 589 1 470 2200 
High 5 628 14 950 37 286 
Low 74 289 1 169 
Medium 541 2 119 8 568 2300 
High 69 188 270 737 1 094 982 
 
 
Observations: 
1. Given the lowest population estimate and the lowest growth rate, the size of 
the world economy in 2100 as well as in 2300 will be more or less comparable to 
that of today. 
2. Given the medium population estimate and the medium growth rate, the 
annual size of the world economy by 2300 will be comparable to all economic 
activity that has (as of today) ever taken place. 
3. Given the highest population estimate and the highest growth rate, the daily 
size of the world economy by 2300 will be comparable to all economic activity 
that has (as of today) ever taken place. 
 
 
 
7. Technology 
 
So far we have covered future scenarios of world population and economic 
growth. Where does this leave the environment? In Table 10, future technology – 
in a broad sense the way in which economic activity is carried out – is quantified 
in terms of the Environmental efficiency factor (EEF). The basic formal assump-
tion underlying these calculations is that the environmental pressure as of year 
2000 remains constant for the next three centuries. In other words: 
 
EEF = 1/(World GDP) 
 
For reasons of readability the formula is subsequently inverted. The numbers in 
Table 10, in other words, express by what factor environmental efficiency (per 
1990 USD of GDP) has to increase in order to keep environmental pressure 
constant at 2000-levels. 
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Table 10. Environmental efficiency factor 2000–2300  
Inverted 
 
  Population 
Year Growth rate Low Medium High 
Low 2 3 4 
Medium 3 5 8 2100 
High 15 26 39 
Low 2 4 11 
Medium 6 16 40 2200 
High 154 410 1 021 
Low 2 8 32 
Medium 15 58 235 2300 
High 1 895 7 417 29 998 
 
 
Observations: 
1. Given the lowest population estimate and the lowest growth rate, $2 of 
future GDP must not cause more problems than $1 of GDP does today in order to 
keep environmental pressure constant. 
2. Given the medium population estimate and the medium growth rate, $5 of 
future GDP in year 2100, $16 in year 2200 and $58 in year 2300 must not cause 
more problems than $1 of GDP does today in order to keep environmental 
pressure constant. 
3. Given the highest population estimate and the highest growth rate, $39 of 
future GDP in year 2100, about $1.000 in year 2200 and about $30.000 in year 
2300 must not cause more problems than $1 of GDP does today in order to keep 
environmental pressure constant. 
 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
1. Future growth is hard to predict, as is the life expectancy of the growth 
economy. However, there is always history. Given a low growth rate, comparable 
to that of 1820-1870, it is conceivable that the growth economy can persist for at 
least 300 more years. This presupposes a decline in world population that will 
leave the population of year 2300 at about a third of today’s level. Even under 
such circumstances, $2 of future GDP would have to cause no more problems than 
$1 of GDP does today in order to keep environmental pressure constant. 
2. Higher growth rates, such as those of 1973–2000, are likely to result in a 
significantly higher environmental pressure in the long run than what is the case 
today. 
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3. Those who want to sustain the growth economy for as long as possible 
should start to discuss what growth rate is desirable in the long run9, and the 
desirability of a long-term decline in the world population. 
4. Those who want the world population to stay at a level comparable to that of 
today in the long run should start to discuss the desirability of a shift from growth 
economy to a more stable economic system. 
5. Those who want to minimize the environmental pressure should pay atten-
tion to both the desirability of a long-term decline in the world population and of a 
shift to a more stable economic system. 
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9
  A ‘low growth’-policy would have to include a policy of controlled (or restricted) productivity 
growth, thus changing our way of relating to technological development. 
